1. Introducing Signaling Game in Investment

1.1 Why do we use signaling model?

The signaling game is aimed to evaluate the problem of asymmetrical information in investment. The existing asymmetry of information in market would not give investors clear pictures about the potential of their investments (Vrankić & Skoko, 2021). To support their investors' confidence and secure the funds they need; one possible method of firms could be using equity offer as signals to convince investors about their profitability.

1.2 What do we expect from signaling game?

According to Leland and Pyle (1977), firms with higher qualities and potentials would be more willing to retain their equity as much as possible. This feature was revealed in the model proposed in Gibbons (1992) to assess the lowest acceptable equity stake of investors and firms. It assumes the project quality as public knowledge while the profitability of different firms as private information. This project will revise this model and corroborate its properties by using the computation and visualization tool of Clojure.

2. Revising the Signaling Game Model

As is noted in Gibbons (1992), suppose there were two types of firms with different profitability π : H and L. To raise fund I for a project with potential revenue R, firms could incentivize their investors by offering equity stake $0 \le s \le 1$ as a signal for their profitability. It could be assumed that the revenue R would be more attractive than the profit reaping from using this fund I to invest in other fields, which could be depicted as $R \ge I(1 + r)$, where r is the rate of return of firm by investing in its alternative projects.

For firms, the highest acceptable equity stake for firm to undertake the project should secure a positive profit after equity offering.

$$(1-s)(\pi+R) \ge \pi$$

$$s \le \frac{R}{(\pi+R)} = benchmark_{firm}(\pi)$$


Correspondingly, for investors, the minimum value of their acceptable equity stake to accept the offer should ensure their income exceeding the profit from alternative investments. In light of the information asymmetry, the investor could only evaluate investees' quality by their expectation about the probability q that firm has low profitability L, which would constitute their investment confidence. Hence, according to Gibbons (as cited in Vrankić & Skoko, 2021), for investors, their lowest acceptable equity stake could be denoted as

$$s(qL + (1 - q)H + R) \ge I(1 + r)$$

$$s \ge \frac{I(1 + r)}{(qL + (1 - q)H + R)} = benchmark_{investor}(q)$$

3. Visualizing Game Model with Clojure


Given that both investors and investees would pursue the highest profit with lower cost, he investors' lowest acceptable equity stake would determine the equilibrium state of this signaling game.



4.1. Empirical Research Design

To corroborate the negative signaling effect of equity offer on investment confidence, we retrieved transaction detail of 231 venture capital investment in US over the past 10 years from Refinitiv Eikon. Given that the investor confidence would be hard to measure, we evaluated investment success with the number and dollar amount of investment the firm received to date. SWe included the offer size (Investor_Equity_Total) to avoid the scale problem of equity offering. Given that investors would have different estimation about the development situation of different industries (Vismara, 2016), the dummy variable Industry_Sector was incorporated to control this bias of investors' preference. To control the market fluctuation in different year, the time-series variable years was also included. According to the studies conducted by Vismara (2016), we controlled the firm's location advantage by invoking a dummy variable Location to indicate whether the firm is in New York. Furthermore, following the method of the studies conducted by Busenitz, Fiet, and Moesel (2005), we also incorporated variables to control the impact of firms' age (Age), and the duration of investment round (Duration).

4.2. Descriptive Statistics



4.3 Preliminary Analysis




Fig. 1

Company_Status	Share_Ratio_avg	3.25E+08		
Acquisition	0.214118334			
Active	0.110721516	3.82E+08 1.36E+09		
Bankruptcy - Chapter 11	0.19047619			
Defunct	0.934673031	3.80E+07		
LBO	0.2	3000000		
Pending Acquisition	0.247586419	1.44E+08		
Went Public	0.088442637	1.62E+09		
	Table.1			

Apart from the investment amount and number, the Refinitiv Eikon also provided firms' current operating status, which would also illustrate the success of investments. When comparing firms' status with their investment share ratio, it would be manifested by Fig.1 that the firms maintaining an active status would normally propose a lower average equity offer ratio while the firms going bankruptcy or defunction would have a higher ratio. This property would also help support the signaling effect of the lower equity offering on investors' confidence about firms' quality.

4.4. Outcome of Regression

	Investment Amount (log)	Investment Number (log)	
Round	0.6151***	0.3453***	
Industry_Sector	-0.0191	0.0020	
Investor_Equity_Total	0.8554***	0.04949***	
Duration	0.0003**	3.65119E-05	
Location	-0.1806	-0.0259	
Age	-0.0053	0.0054***	
years	-0.0155	-0.0749***	
Share_Ratio	-1.8477***	-0.1377	
R-square	0.741635561	0.732474618	
	Table 1		

4. Data Analysis and Discussion

Machine Learning Outcome									
Logistic Regression of Company Status			Poisson Regression of Investment Number						
colname	gain	importance-type	precision	colname	gain	importance-type	precision		
years	0.96965006	gain	0.99844479	Round	1.66308307	gain	0.99999996		
Location	0.62429769	gain	0.99844479	years	1.25575073	gain	0.99999996		
vestor_Equity_Total	0.45915755	gain	0.99844479	Duration	1.16979851	gain	0.99999996		
Duration	0.45504177	gain	0.99844479	Age	0.40436149	gain	0.99999996		
Round	0.44497234	gain	0.99844479	Investor_Equity_Total	0.29783025	gain	0.99999996		
Share_Ratio	0.41126775	gain	0.99844479	Share_Ratio	0.23702762	gain	0.99999996		
Age	0.32153715	gain	0.99844479	Industry_Sector	0.11186664	gain	0.99999996		
Industry_Sector	0.27673601	gain	0.99844479	Location	0.10310144	gain	0.999999996		

We did OLS regression of investment number and dollar amount on equity offer. Following the study methods in Vismara (2016), we also used the machine learning function in Clojure to conduct logistic regression of company's status and Poisson regression of investment number on equity ratio as a robustness check. The results of the robustness test went align with the original OLS regression. When analyzing the regression statistics, it is found that the higher equity ratio would contribute to a negative variation in investment number and amount. Nevertheless, its contribution to explaining the variation in investment amount and number would be modest considering the lower coefficient, high p-value in t-test (Table. 1), and the lower importance value in the outcome of machine learning (Table. 2). Hence, in this statistical test, we might not find a sufficiently robust statistical support for the significant contribution of signaling effect to investment success.

As is manifested in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2, it is indicated from the model of Gibbons (1992) that the equilibrium equity stake would have a positive correlation with investors' expectation about the probability of investing in a low profitability firm. In other words, the higher equity stake in investing game would be negatively correlated with the investment confidence

In Fig.2 where the equity benchmark of a high profitability firm is lower than the expected investor benchmark for a low-type firm: benchmark_{firm}(H) < benchmark_{investor}(1), there would be possibility for high-type firms to reject to undertaking investment upon a higher equilibrium s and q (Vrankić & Skoko, 2021). This rejection would further support the negative correlation between equity stake and investment success.

References

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5. Conclusion and Limitation

In conclusion, this project would help testify the signaling effect of equity offering in venture capital investment. It would support the argument that the lower equity offer would contribute to signaling the investor with a higher potential of firms and facilitate the investment success, while the significance of this effect might not be manifested in empirical data. Nevertheless, it is also noteworthy that the sample size and control variable amount in this project would be limited, which would undermine the persuasiveness of regression outcome. In addition, we did not further explore into link between investors' confidence and investment amount, whose robustness would still be uncertain. There needs to be further research with larger sample size and feasible measures of investors' confidence.